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Abstract 
Localism is the view that the unit of evaluation in the scientific realism debate is a single 
scientific discipline, sub-discipline, or claim, whereas individualism is the view that the unit 
of evaluation is a single scientific theory. Localism is compatible, while individualism is not, 
with a local pessimistic induction and a local selective induction. Asay (2016) presents 
several arguments to support localism and undercut globalism, according to which the unit of 
evaluation is the set of all scientific disciplines. I argue that some of his arguments clash with 
localism as well as with globalism and support individualism, and that individualism goes 
hand in hand, while localism does not, with the basic rule of how to evaluate an argument. 
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1. Introduction 
There are many disciplines in current science, including physics, chemistry, biology, geology, 
and psychology. This paper concerns the issue of whether we should evaluate scientific 
disciplines collectively or individually. Traditionally, philosophers of science have evaluated 
them collectively. Their approach is called globalism. Recently, however, some philosophers 
(Ruhmkorff, 2013; Asay, 2016) have rejected globalism and argue that we should instead 
evaluate scientific disciplines locally. Their approach is called localism. 
     This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I explicate Jamin Asay’s (2016) 
distinction between globalism and localism, arguing that localism allows for a local 
pessimistic induction and a local selective induction. In Section 3, I explicate the distinction 
between scientific collectivism and individualism (Park, 2017: 99, 2018a: 57–58, 2018b: 
443–444), arguing that individualism disallows a local pessimistic induction and a local 
selective induction. In Section 4, I argue that some arguments that Asay has offered to 
support localism and undercut globalism actually clash with localism as well as with 
globalism and dovetail with individualism. In Section 5, I reply to objections. 
The main thesis of this paper is that individualism is a better framework for the 
scientific realism debate than localism. It is important to adjudicate between localism and 
individualism because scientific realists and antirealists would be engaged in different sorts 
of debates, depending on whether they adopt localism or individualism as the framework for 
their debates. 
 
2. Globalism vs. Localism 
Traditionally, realists and antirealists take their epistemic attitudes towards all scientific 
theories collectively, defending and attacking such arguments as the no-miracles argument 
(Putnam, 1975: 73) and the pessimistic induction (Poincaré, 1905/1952: 160; Mach, 1911: 17; 
Laudan, 1977: 126; Putnam, 1978: 25; Stanford, 2006: 19-20; Wray, 2013: 4327). The no-
miracles argument says that successful scientific theories are approximately true. By contrast, 
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the pessimistic induction says that successful past theories were overturned, so it is likely that 
successful present theories will also be overturned. These two arguments have opposite 
conclusions, but they have a similarity, viz., they are intended to apply across the board to all 
successful theories in science. Thus, globalism is inherent in them. Globalism is an attempt to 
evaluate all scientific theories or disciplines together. 
Asay (2016) rejects globalism and defends localism. Localism is an attempt to evaluate 
a discipline, sub-discipline, or claim independently of how other disciplines, sub-disciplines, 
or claims are evaluated: 
 
The localist I seek to isolate is one who approaches scientific realism discipline by discipline. 
(Or, as the case may require, sub-discipline by sub-discipline.) The localist might adopt 
structural realism about quantum physics, but realism about biology and constructive 
empiricism about psychology. (Asay, 2016: 4) 
 
Asay also says that we can evaluate “single, individual theses” (2016: 16). Thus, localism, as 
defined by Asay, allows for the evaluation of an entire discipline, say, physics, chemistry, 
biology, or psychology, allows for the evaluation of each sub-discipline of those disciplines, 
and allows for the evaluation of a single scientific claim, such as “Continents move around” 
and “Water is H2O.” 
What sort of debate would realists and antirealists be engaged in under the localist 
framework? Asay says that consistent “success and continuity in some domains can lead to a 
successful but localized no miracles argument, while consistent scientific revolutions in 
others can lead to a successful but localized pessimistic induction” (2016: 16). For example, 
realists would argue that Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory is true on the grounds that its 
success would be a miracle if it were false. This no-miracle argument is local in that it applies 
only to the electromagnetic theory. Pessimists would object that the electromagnetic theory 
will be abandoned, just as its predecessors, viz., the classical particle theory and Fresnel’s 
wave theory, were abandoned. This pessimistic induction is also local in that it applies only to 
theories of light. Realists and antirealists would disagree over whether the local no-miracle 
argument and the local pessimistic induction1 are strong or weak, but they would agree that 
the arguments apply only to theories of light, and that the “best way to come to the truth 
about scientific realism is to explore each branch of science individually on its own 
metaphysical and epistemological terms” (Asay, 2016: 4). 
Just as there is a local pessimistic induction as well as a global pessimistic induction, so 
there is a local selective induction as well as a global selective induction. According to a 
global selective induction, since the same kind of theoretical claims was preserved across all 
scientific disciplines, that kind of theoretical claims will be preserved across all scientific 
disciplines. Different selectivists2 identify different kinds of theoretical claims as stable. John 
Worrall (1989) observes that a mathematical equation was preserved in the transition from 
Fresnel’s ether theory to the electromagnetic theory. Philip Kitcher (1993: 140-149) observes 
that a working posit was preserved in the transition from the ether theory to the 
electromagnetic theory. Stathis Psillos (1999: Chapter 5) observes that a working posit was 
preserved in the transition from the caloric theory to the kinetic theory. Pierre Cruse and 
David Papineau (2002) observe that a Ramsey sentence was preserved in the transition from 
the ether theory to the electromagnetic theory. These philosophers’ examples of preserved 
theoretical claims are intended to be representative of the population of all preserved 
                                                          
1 See Samuel Ruhmkorff (2013) for a real example of local pessimistic induction. 
2 Selectivists are usually called selective realists. As P. Kyle Stanford (2015: 876) maintains, however, it is not 
clear whether they deserve the appellation ‘realists.’ 
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theoretical claims in science. By contrast, according to a local selective induction, since a 
certain kind of theoretical claims was preserved in a discipline or sub-discipline, that kind of 
theoretical claims will be preserved in that discipline or sub-discipline. This local selective 
induction applies only to that discipline or sub-discipline, and hence it is compatible with the 
situation in which in a certain discipline or sub-discipline, a mathematical equation is 
preserved; in another, a working posit; in another, a Ramsey sentence; in another, both a 
working posit and a Ramsey sentence; and in another, no theoretical claim. 
A local selective induction has an advantage over a global selective induction. A local 
selective induction remains unscathed, even if the humoral theory, the miasma theory, and the 
germ theory do not have a common theoretical constituent, and even if upon reflecting “on 
the vast complexities of various historical episodes in science, there is no reason to think that 
the general assumptions one finds will be at all simple, natural, or even non-disjunctive” 
(Magnus and Callender, 2004: 335). These observations of the history of diverse disciplines 
refute a global selective induction, but not a local selective induction. Local selectivists can 
cheerfully grant that a certain discipline does not preserve any theoretical claim, and that 
different disciplines preserve different kinds of theoretical claims. 
In sum, localism is compatible with a local no-miracle argument, a local pessimistic 
induction, and a local selective induction. Local realists and antirealists are engaged in 
debates over whether such arguments are tenable, subjecting them to the tribunal of the 
history of science. Thus, the history of science acts as an arbiter between local realists and 
antirealists, just as it does between global realists and antirealists. 
 
3. Collectivism vs. Individualism 
Scientific collectivism and individualism hold, respectively, that we should evaluate scientific 
theories collectively and individually, i.e., that the unit of evaluation is a set of scientific 
theories and a single theory, respectively (Park, 2017: 99, 2018a: 57–58, 2018b: 443–444). In 
this paper, individualism is committed to the view (Lipton, 2001: 353; Achinstein, 2002; 
Enfield, 2008: 891; Roush, 2010; Fitzpatrick, 2013) that scientists’ arguments for scientific 
theories are all the evidence for scientific theories, so the epistemic status of scientific 
theories is not affected by philosophical arguments, such as pessimistic and selective 
inductions.  
Globalism and collectivism make different claims about the scope of evaluation. While 
globalism claims that it is always all scientific theories or all scientific disciplines, 
collectivism claims that it might be a set of all scientific theories, a set of present theories 
belonging to the different disciplines, or a set of past and present theories belonging to the 
same discipline. Localism and individualism also make different claims about the scope of 
evaluation. While individualism claims that it is always a single theory, localism claims that it 
might be a single discipline, e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, and so forth, or a single sub-
discipline, e.g., “organic chemistry, physical chemistry, and biochemistry” (Asay, 2016: 16). 
Or it might be “single, individual theses” (Asay, 2016: 16). Given that there are multiple 
theories in a discipline or sub-discipline, localism is compatible with a collective evaluation 
of scientific theories, whereas individualism is not. 
Suppose that there are three theories – T1, T2, and T3 – in the same discipline of current 
science. They are, say, the Big Bang theory, the kinetic theory, and the electromagnetic theory. 
All of them belong to physics, but they belong to different sub-disciplines of physics. 
According to localism, T1, T2, and T3 can be evaluated together; however, according to 
individualism, they cannot. Local realists say that T1, T2, and T3 are successful, so they are 
true. Local pessimists object that their forerunners were discarded, so they will also be 
discarded. Local selectivists reply that the constituents that T1, T2, and T3 share with their 
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predecessors are true. By contrast, individualists say that scientists’ arguments for T1, T2, and 
T3 are different from one another, so they should be evaluated separately. The outcome of 
individualists’ evaluation might be the same as that of local pessimists. For example, 
individualists might agree with local pessimists that T1, T2, and T3 are all unwarranted. 
Individualists, however, think so not on the grounds that their predecessors were unwarranted 
but on the grounds that scientists’ arguments for them are weak, exposing specific problems 
with scientists’ arguments for them. So individualists and localists can arrive at the same 
conclusion, but they rely on different premises. 
Suppose now that T1, T2, and T3 are successive theories in the same discipline, say, the 
classical particle theory, Fresnel’s wave theory, and Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. As we 
noted before, localism allows for the local pessimistic induction that since T1 and T2 were 
thrown out, T3 will also be thrown out, and also allows for the local selective induction that 
since only the common theoretical constituent of T1, T2, and T3 was stable, only it will be 
stable in future developments of their discipline. Individualism, by contrast, disallows for the 
local pessimistic induction and the local selective induction. Once individualists believe that 
scientists’ arguments for T3 are strong, they believe not only that the common constituent is 
true but also that the other constituents of T3 are true. Once they believe that scientists’ 
arguments for it are weak, they do not even believe that the common constituent is true. 
Neither the fact that T1 and T2 were discarded nor the fact that T1, T2, and T3 have a common 
constituent makes any difference to the epistemic status of T3. The epistemic status of T3 is 
determined solely by the strength of scientists’ arguments for it. 
Under the framework of individualism, realists and antirealists are engaged with the 
details of scientists’ arguments for a particular scientific theory. They disagree over whether 
the arguments are strong or weak, but they agree that being engaged with the details of 
scientists’ arguments and evaluating them thoroughly is the only way to resolve the dispute 
between them. They also agree that the evaluation of scientists’ arguments for a theory does 
not affect the evaluation of scientists’ arguments for another theory, even if the two theories 
belong to the same discipline. The individualist framework contrasts with the localist 
framework under which realists and antirealists are allowed to defend and attack a local 
pessimistic induction and a local selective induction, which are all attempts to evaluate 
collectively a group of scientific theories belonging to the same discipline or sub-discipline. 
Why should we choose individualism over localism as a framework for the debate 
between realists and antirealists? In the next section, I argue that some arguments that Asay 
adduces to justify localism and undermine globalism actually undermine both localism and 
globalism and support individualism.  
 
4. Individualism over Localism 
4.1. The Argument from Diversity 
The argument from diversity, which Asay takes to be the most powerful argument for 
localism, holds that different disciplines postulate diverse theoretical entities, and that the 
diverse theoretical entities are of varying degrees of epistemic status. For example, the 
“ontological and epistemological issues concerning the existence of fields, quarks, and forces 
are distinct from those concerning mitochondria and bacteria, not to mention beliefs and 
desires” (Asay, 2016: 6). So lumping together all theoretical entities or scientific disciplines 
under the single heading of scientific realism “is bound to ignore and erase the very real 
differences between the different scientific disciplines” (Asay, 2016: 6). 
In my view, however, ontological and epistemic differences exist not only between 
present theories belonging to different disciplines but also between past and present theories 
belonging to the same discipline. Consider, for example, that the caloric theory and the 
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kinetic theory postulate different theoretical entities: caloric and molecules. The ontological 
and epistemic differences between caloric and molecules are no smaller than those between 
fields and mitochondria. It follows that the argument from diversity supports not only the 
independent evaluations of present theories belonging to different disciplines but also the 
independent evaluations of past and present theories belonging to the same discipline. 
The ontological and epistemic differences between mitochondria and strings invalidate 
the inference that since string theory is a collection of speculative assumptions for which 
there is no direct empirical evidence, molecular biology is also a bunch of speculative 
assumptions for which there is no direct empirical evidence. Similarly, the ontological and 
epistemic differences between caloric and molecules invalidate the local pessimistic 
induction that since the caloric theory was ousted, the kinetic theory will also be ousted, as 
well as the local selective induction that since only the common constituent of the two 
theories was stable, only that constituent will be stable. 
The ontological and epistemic differences between mitochondria and strings require 
that we should evaluate biologists’ arguments for the claims of molecular biology 
independently of how we evaluate physicists’ arguments for string theory. Analogously, the 
ontological and epistemic differences between caloric and molecules require that we should 
evaluate kinetic scientists’ arguments for the kinetic theory independently of how we evaluate 
caloric scientists’ arguments for the caloric theory. 
In sum, if realists and antirealists take Asay’s argument from diversity seriously, they 
should reject localism and accept individualism as the framework for their debate. 
Individualism implies that if kinetic scientists’ arguments for the kinetic theory are strong, we 
may accept the theory in toto despite the fact that caloric scientists’ arguments for the caloric 
theory were weak. If kinetic scientists’ arguments for the kinetic theory are weak, we may 
reject it in toto despite the fact that the kinetic theory has a common theoretical constituent 
with the caloric theory. Or we may accept only the common constituent, depending on 
whether scientists’ arguments for it allow us to do so. Consequently, it is not localism but 
rather individualism that enshrines the spirit of the argument from diversity. 
 
4.2. The Argument from Disunity 
Reductionism and anti-reductionism hold, respectively, that special sciences are and are not 
reducible to physics. Asay’s argument from disunity says that globalism and localism go well 
with reductionism and anti-reductionism, respectively. If special sciences are reducible to 
physics, and if you believe that physical theories are true, you should also believe that 
chemical theories and biological theories are true, i.e., you should be a global realist. If, 
however, special sciences are not reducible to physics, “one possible avenue to globalism 
about science is immediately shut down” (Asay, 2016: 9).  
Asay observes that different sciences use different methods. For example, scientists use 
the method of observing phenomena in historical science, whereas scientists use the method 
of creating phenomena in experimental science. He says that if “different sciences use 
different epistemological methods, then we need to evaluate those methods on a case-by-case 
basis in determining what the best attitude is to take with respect to them vis-à-vis realism” 
(2016: 8). Thus, an argument supporting anti-reductionism supports localism. 
Again, however, if realists and antirealists take Asay’s argument from disunity 
seriously, they should reject localism and accept individualism. Ptolemaic scientists and 
Copernican scientists used different methods to justify their pet theories. For example, 
Ptolemaic scientists denied, while Copernican scientists affirmed, that a telescope correctly 
reflected the celestial sphere. It follows that Ptolemaic astronomy is not reducible to 
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Copernican astronomy. In general, new scientists use more advanced technologies than old 
scientists. Therefore, an old theory is not reducible to a new theory.  
In addition, to say that T1 is reducible to T2 means that T2 explains T1 (Nagel, 1979: 
338). For example, statistical mechanics explains thermodynamics, and hence 
thermodynamics is reducible to statistical mechanics. According to Nagel, T1 is reducible to 
T2 when T1 is deducible from T2. Thus, his view about the condition of reduction is consistent 
with Carl Hempel’s (1966) deductive-nomological model of explanation that some scientific 
explanations take the form of a deductive argument. Is the Ptolemaic theory deducible from 
the Copernican theory? The answer is no. So the Ptolemaic theory is not reducible to the 
Copernican theory.  
The same goes for other successive theories, such as the pair of the phlogiston theory 
and the oxygen theory and the pair of the caloric theory and the kinetic theory. The old 
theories are not reducible to the new theories. Thus, the argument from disunity suggests that 
they should be evaluated separately, and that realists and antirealists should choose 
individualism over localism.  
 
4.3. The Argument from Hasty Generalizations 
The argument from hasty generalizations holds that globalism commits the fallacy of hasty 
generalization whereas localism does not. Worrall, for example, observes that a mathematical 
equation was preserved in the transitions of the theories of light in the nineteenth century. On 
the basis of this single case study, he generalizes that we are justified in believing in the 
structure of all unobservables, but not in their nature. Such a generalization is hasty. Asay 
says that if “the history of the theory of light is best understood along the lines that Worrall 
tells it, then perhaps a structuralist view about light is appropriate; but it’s no argument at all 
that we should be structuralists about genes or epidemiology or any other area of science” 
(2016: 13). 
     In my view, however, the fallacy of hasty generalization occurs not only when our 
generalization is about all theories across different disciplines but also when it is about all 
successive theories in the same discipline. Consider the local pessimistic induction that since 
theories of light were unstable in the nineteenth century, all theories of light will be unstable. 
Such a generalization is also hasty. Consider also the local selective induction that since only 
a mathematical equation was preserved in the transitions of the theories of light in the 
nineteenth century, only a mathematical equation will be preserved in all the transitions of 
theories of light. Such a generalization is also hasty. 
In sum, the argument from hasty generalizations conflicts with localism, but it sits well 
with individualism that we should evaluate even successive theories of the same discipline 
individually. Therefore, realists and antirealists can avoid a hasty generalization by choosing 
individualism over localism. 
 
4.4. The Argument from Other Fields of Philosophy 
Asay observes that there are realism debates in other fields of philosophy, such as ethics and 
aesthetics. But these fields of philosophy are homogeneous. For example, ethicists ask and 
answer questions like “Do moral facts inhabit the universe?” and “Can we have moral 
knowledge?” By contrast, science is a heterogeneous field. Cosmologists ask and answer 
questions like “What is the origin of the universe?” and “Are there parallel universes?” Germ 
theorists ask and answer questions like “How is the Zika virus transmitted?” and “How can 
we control super viruses?” Ethicists are interested in homogeneous questions, but 
cosmologists and germ theorists are interested in heterogeneous questions. 
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The argument from other fields of philosophy holds that localism goes along with the 
realism debates in other fields of philosophy, but globalism does not.3 The scientific realism 
debate should go hand in hand with the realism debates in other fields of philosophy because 
finding “common ground with the other realism debates in philosophy is potentially quite 
illuminating; the closer these other realism concerns come to the realism concerns of science, 
the more the parties to the different debates can learn from one another” (Asay, 2016: 8). 
     I welcome Asay’s suggestion that the participants in the scientific realism debate and 
those of the realism debates in other fields of philosophy should communicate with one 
another. In my view, the former need to know what the latter would think of pessimistic and 
selective inductions. Philosophers in other fields of philosophy would think of them, global 
or local, as unusual, given that the way they assess philosophical positions is radically 
different from the ways in which pessimists and selectivists assess scientific theories. 
Consider, for example, that there are many views of mind in the history of philosophy 
of mind. They include substance dualism, philosophical behaviorism, the identity theory, 
functionalism, and property dualism. Each of these theories of mind is supported and 
undermined by arguments that rivaling philosophers have constructed for and against it. 
Philosophers of mind engage with the details of arguments for a theory of mind to determine 
their attitudes towards it. They accept or reject, for example, property dualism, depending on 
whether property dualists’ arguments for it are strong or weak. Those arguments include the 
ones constructed by Thomas Nagel (1974), Ned Block (1978), and Frank Jackson (1986). 
Now, consider the transitions of the theories of light in the nineteenth century from the 
classical particle theory to Fresnel’s wave theory to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. 
Scientists presented arguments for each of these theories. But pessimists determine their 
attitude towards the electromagnetic theory not in consideration of how strong scientists’ 
arguments for it are but in consideration of what happened to the classical particle theory and 
to Fresnel’s wave theory. They believe that since the classical particle theory and Fresnel’s 
wave theory were thrown out, the electromagnetic theory will also be thrown out. Similarly, 
selectivists determine their attitude towards the electromagnetic theory not in consideration of 
how strong scientists’ arguments for it are but in consideration of what happened to the 
classical particle theory and Fresnel’s wave theory. They believe that only the common 
constituent of the three theories is true.  
How would philosophers of mind determine their attitudes towards Maxwell’s 
electromagnetic theory, were they philosophers of science? They would engage with the 
details of scientists’ arguments for it. If the arguments for it are strong, they would believe 
that it is true, regardless of whether its predecessors were overturned. If the arguments for it 
are weak, they would believe that it will be ousted in toto, regardless of whether it has a 
common constituent with its predecessors. In short, they would determine their attitudes 
towards it solely in consideration of how strong scientists’ arguments for it are, i.e., exactly as 
individualism recommends them to do. 
How would pessimists and selectivists determine their attitudes towards property 
dualism, were they philosophers of mind? Pessimists would not engage with the details of the 
arguments constructed by Nagel, Block, and Jackson. They would rather be interested in 
whether there were theories of mind that turned out to be problematic prior to property 
dualism, thinking that if there were such theories, property dualism will also turn out to be 
problematic. Selectivists would not engage with the details of the property dualists’ 
arguments for property dualism either. They would rather be interested in whether there is a 
constituent common to all the theories of mind in the history of philosophy of mind, thinking 
                                                          
3 Asay takes the argument from other fields of philosophy to be part of the argument from diversity. It seems to 
me, however, that it can be taken to be a separate argument for localism. 
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that only the common constituent is true. Pessimists and selectivists have something 
interesting in common. In order to determine their attitudes towards property dualism, they 
investigate what happened to its predecessors.  
Whose methods are reasonable, the one that philosophers of mind use or the ones that 
pessimists and selectivists use? The former coincides with the method that we usually use to 
evaluate an argument. Suppose that there are two arguments. One is intended to justify p; the 
other is intended to justify q. If we want to decide whether to accept or reject q, we should 
evaluate the argument for q, and we should not evaluate the argument for p. This basic rule of 
how to evaluate an argument is observed by philosophers of mind. For example, they assess 
not Descartes’ argument for substance dualism but the property dualists’ arguments for 
property dualism in order to accept or reject property dualism. 
The basic rule, however, is violated by pessimists and selectivists. For example, they 
evaluate not scientists’ arguments for the electromagnetic theory but instead scientists’ 
arguments for its predecessors in order to accept or reject it. Pessimists argue that scientists’ 
arguments for its predecessors were bad, so scientists’ arguments for it are also bad. 
Selectivists argue that scientists’ arguments for its predecessors were not terribly bad, so 
scientists’ arguments for it are not terribly bad either. The ways pessimists and selectivists 
determine their attitudes towards the electromagnetic theory are bizarre from the perspective 
of those who abide by the basic rule. 
In sum, Asay’s argument from other fields of philosophy collides with localism, which 
allows for a local pessimistic induction and a local selective induction, but goes hand in hand 
with individualism, which says that we should evaluate scientists’ arguments for a present 
theory, not their arguments for its predecessors, to determine whether it is true or false. 
Thus far I have argued that the argument from diversity, the argument from disunity, 
the argument from hasty generalizations, and the argument from other fields of philosophy 
support separate treatments of successive theories in the same scientific discipline. However, 
they also support separate treatments of multiple present theories in the same scientific 
discipline. For example, the general theory of relativity is not reducible to the kinetic theory. 
So if realists and antirealists take the argument from disunity seriously, they should not be 
localists but instead individualists about the general theory of relativity and the kinetic theory, 
even though they belong to the same discipline. I will not, however, flesh out this line of 
objections to localism because they can be extrapolated from my previous objections to 
localism sketched above. 
Finally, I must admit that all those objections do not apply to localism when localists 
evaluate a single scientific claim. However, I must point out that when they evaluate a single 
scientific claim, they should dismiss pessimistic and selective inductions just as flatly as 
individualists do. For example, when they evaluate the single scientific claim that continents 
move around, they should not consider previous claims about the motion of continents at all. 
They should rather look into scientists’ arguments for it. 
 
5. Objections and Replies 
Localists might argue that there is an advantage of localism over individualism. Individualists’ 
unit of evaluation is fixed, i.e., it is always a single theory. By contrast, localists’ unit of 
evaluation is not fixed. It can be a discipline, a sub-discipline, or a scientific claim, depending 
on the details of disciplines, sub-disciplines, and scientific claims. It is more reasonable to 
change the scope of evaluation on a case-by-case basis than not to change it at all. 
This objection to individualism has the following three problems. First, it is not 
available to Asay, given that he proposes that philosophers of science should communicate 
with philosophers of other fields of philosophy. Philosophers of mind never change the scope 
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of their evaluation. It is not the case, for example, that they evaluate substance dualism and 
property dualism collectively on the grounds that they are just different forms of dualism, and 
that they evaluate philosophical behaviorism, the identity theory, and functionalism 
individually on the grounds that they are different forms of materialism. 
Second, as noted earlier, localists dismiss pessimistic and selective inductions when 
they evaluate a scientific claim. So changing the scope of evaluation has a grave consequence, 
viz., localists sometimes regard pessimistic and selective inductions to be legitimate and at 
other times to be illegitimate. It is not clear under what conditions they are legitimate and 
illegitimate. It is problematic to suggest that they are legitimate when localists evaluate a 
discipline or sub-discipline, and that they are illegitimate when localists evaluate a single 
claim. Localists should specify the conditions under which pessimistic and selective 
inductions are legitimate and illegitimate independently of how the unit of evaluation is 
determined. 
Third, changing the unit of evaluation means that localists sometimes evaluate a 
discipline or sub-discipline, which in turn means that they sometimes violate the basic rule of 
how to evaluate an argument. If scientists have presented arguments for q, we should evaluate 
those arguments in order to determine whether q is true or false. We should never evaluate 
scientists’ arguments for p and then claim that since the arguments for p are weak, q is 
unwarranted. It follows that the alleged advantage of localism is actually a disadvantage of it. 
Localists might retort that we can evaluate scientists’ arguments for p and their 
arguments for q collectively in certain cases. If the former closely resemble the latter, and if 
the former are weak, we are entitled to conclude that the latter are also weak. Thus, we can 
evaluate scientists’ arguments for the caloric theory and their arguments for the kinetic theory 
collectively, and say that since the former are bad, the latter are also bad. 
This defense of a collective evaluation, however, runs counter to Asay’s 
aforementioned arguments for localism. For example, he argues that scientists’ arguments for 
the existence of strings are different from their arguments for the existence of mitochondria, 
so we should evaluate them independently of each other. In Section 4.1., I replied that 
scientists’ arguments for the caloric theory are also different from their arguments for the 
kinetic theory, so we should also evaluate them independently of each other. It is to give up 
localism for localists to say that they are similar, so they can be evaluated collectively. After 
all, if they say so, they should also say that scientists’ arguments for the existence of strings 
are also similar to their arguments for the existence of mitochondria, so they can also be 
evaluated collectively. 
An anonymous referee of this journal raises the following interesting objection. 
Individualism clashes with Duhem’s thesis, which holds that auxiliary hypotheses are 
required in order to render a theory predictive. How can we seriously hold that the unit of 
evaluation is a single scientific theory? We should not just use judgements like ‘T is 
consistent with the rest of science,’ at least from a realist perspective, because consistency is 
not much of a virtue if the rest of science is false. Moreover, consistency might not be 
expected if the rest of science is merely approximately true. 
     This objection is built upon a somewhat uncharitable interpretation of individualism. 
Individualism asserts that the unit of evaluation in the scientific realism debate is a single 
scientific theory, which is not to deny that auxiliary assumptions are required to derive 
testable implications from a theory. Suppose that T1 issues testable consequences in 
conjunction with A1 and B1, that some testable consequences agree with observations, and 
that others disagree with observations. Suppose that T2 issues testable implications in 
conjunction with A2 and B2, and that testable consequences have so far agreed with 
observations. Individualism asserts that from the fact that T1 is disconfirmed, it does not 
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follow that T2 will be disconfirmed, and that from the fact that T2 has been confirmed so far, 
it does not follow that T1 is confirmed. In other words, the epistemic status of T1 is not 
affected by the epistemic status of T2, and vice versa. Consequently, when we take an 
epistemic attitude towards T1, we should not take the epistemic status of T2 into account, and 
vice versa. 
Moreover, the referee’s objection above applies not only to individualism but also to 
localism. How can we evaluate a single scientific claim or a single scientific discipline? A 
single scientific claim might not be able to meet the tribunal of experience alone! A scientific 
discipline might need another scientific discipline to entail testable implications. I suppose 
that Asay would defend localism along the line I sketched above. In any event, even if the 
referee’s objection undermines individualism, it is entirely a separate issue whether it also 
undermines the main thesis of this paper. In other words, even if Duhem’s thesis conflicts 
with individualism, as the referee suggests, it might still be true that individualism is a better 
framework for the scientific realism debate than localism. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Localism comes down to the motto that “what goes for one science need not go for others” 
(Asay, 2106: 6). Asay has constructed impressive arguments to support localism and 
undermine globalism. It is my analysis, however, that they undercut localism as well as 
globalism. This unfortunate consequence stems from the fact that localism allows for a 
collective evaluation of scientific theories. 
Individualists argue that what goes for a theory need not go for another theory, and 
hence that what goes for a past theory need not go for a present theory in the same discipline 
as well as that what goes for a present theory need not go for another present theory in the 
same discipline. My argument for individualism is simple: if we want to take an attitude 
toward a theory, we should evaluate scientists’ arguments for that very theory and should not 
evaluate scientists’ arguments for other theories. 
Pessimists and selectivists, global or local, are history-chauvinists in that they look to 
past theories in order to determine their attitudes towards present theories. By contrast, 
individualists are argument-chauvinists in that they look to scientists’ arguments for present 
theories to determine their attitudes towards them. Individualists observe the basic rule of 
how to evaluate an argument, whereas pessimists and selectivists do not. Pessimists and 
selectivists have places under the localist framework, but not under the individualist 
framework. Therefore, realists and antirealists should choose individualism over localism as 
the framework of their debates. 
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